Possibility to obtain SPCs broadened by three eagerly awaited CJ decisions
On 12 December 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJ") handed down
three important decisions regarding the interpretation of Regulation 469/2009 (the "SPC Regulation"). These three decisions are expected to impact your SPC strategies. In Actavis v Sanofi (C-443/12) and Georgetown II (C-484/12), the CJ clarified the
circumstances in which Article 3(c) of the SPC Regulation may allow the granting of more
than one supplementary protection certificate ("SPC") per basic patent. In Eli Lilly v HGS
(C-493/12), the CJ sanctioned a broad interpretation of "protected by a basic patent in
force" (3(a) SPC Regulation) which can also include functional claims.
Background: uncertainty after Medeva, Georgetown I and Queensland
Two years ago, the CJ handed down a series of decisions regarding the granting of SPCs for
combination products (clickfor our Legal Alert on Medeva and Georgetown(I) a
for the one on Yeda, Queensland and Daiichi). The interpretation of these decisions created
considerable uncertainty and led to multiple referrals by national courts to the CJ, three of
which have now been decided, clarifying the following two items from the earlier rulings that
(i) In the 2011 decisions the CJ ruled that, in relation to marketing authorisations ("MA") for
combination products, a product is "protected by a basic patent in force" as required by Art
3(a) SPC Regulation if the product "is specified (or identified) in the wording of the claims of the basic patent" (the "Medeva-rule"; therewith dismissing the "infringement test" and
embracing the "disclosure test", see ourfor more details). However, what
remained unclear to industrial property offices ("IPOs") and national courts was the level of
specification in the claims required to obtain an SPC for active ingredients.
(ii) In Queensland the CJ considered "where a product is protected by a number of basic patents in force, each of those patents may be designated for the purpose of the procedure for the grant of a certificate but only one certificate may be granted for that basic patent (…).". This prompted several national IPOs to stop their practice of granting SPCs for different
products based on the same patent whereas other IPOs continued to grant several SPCs
Eli Lilly v HGS concerns the first issue and Georgetown II and Actavis v Sanofi shed light on
the second controversy as discussed below.
(i) When is an active ingredient considered "protected by a basic patent in force" (Art. 3(a) SPC Regulation)?
Eli Lilly was developing a specific antibody that would fall within the protection of HGS' patent.
The patent contains a broad claim covering all (therapeutic) antibodies specifically binding to a
certain new protein (neutrokine-α) which HGS discovered to be linked to autoimmune diseases. Antibodies that can bind to this protein could thus be beneficial and the patent claims
such antibodies functionally, without specifying individual antibodies (including the one that Eli
Lilly was developing) explicitly. In so far as relevant here, the parties are divided about whether
HGS would be able to claim an SPC for Eli Lilly's antibody. More specifically, the issue that
kept parties divided was whether for HGS' patent individual antibodies are sufficiently
"specified in the wording of the claims of the basic patent" to be considered protected by the
basic patent (Art. 3(a) SPC regulation) as set out in the Medeva-rule. The referring court
essentially asked the CJ to clarify whether to meet this rule the claims of a patent should
contain a structural definition of the specific active ingredient (the antibody), or whether a
In Eli Lilly v HGS the CJ has now ruled that in order for an active ingredient to be regarded as
‘protected by a basic patent in force’ within the meaning of Article 3(a) SPC Regulation, it is not
necessary for the active ingredient to be identified in the claims of the patent by a structural
formula. A functional description can be sufficient for identification purposes (the CJ adds that
this is for national courts to decide while also taking article 69 EPC into account), provided that
it is possible to conclude on the basis of the claims of the basic patent "that the claims relate, implicitly but necessarily and specifically, to the active ingredient in question". Dutch Courts
already interpreted the Medeva-rule in a similar way (Court of Appeal of The Hague in
Lundbeck v Generieken, 24 January 2012, and District Court of The Hague in Sanofi v Pharmachemie and Teva,14 September 2012). The CJ clearly considers – in paragraph 38 -
that an active ingredient which is not identified in the claims of a basic patent through either a
structural or functional definition cannot be regarded as "protected by a basic patent" within the
This decision broadens the possibility of obtaining SPCs, as the Medeva-test can also be
fulfilled by functional claims and not only by structural claims.
(ii) Does Article 3(c) preclude the patent owner from obtaining SPCs for multiple products under one basic patent?
For the granting of an SPC, Article 3(c) SPC Regulation requires that "the product has not already been the subject of a certificate". In both Actavis v Sanofi and Georgetown II the
referring courts, from the UK and the Netherlands respectively, sought to clarify whether Article
3(c) SPC Regulation precludes the holder of the basic patent from being granted an SPC for
each of the products protected in situations where a basic patent in force protects several
products. The answer in Actavis v Sanofi is yes, and in Georgetown II no. The difference in
outcome lies in the factual circumstances of the cases. The general rule seems to be that on
the basis of a patent which protects several different 'products' it is possible to obtain several
SPCs in relation to each of those products, provided that each active ingredient of a product is
as such protected as an 'inventive advance' by the basic patent.
In Actavis v Sanofi, Sanofi had obtained one SPC for irbesartan and another one for irbesartan
in combination with HCTZ (pre-Medeva), based on an MA for irbesartan and a second (later
obtained) MA for irbesartan and HCTZ. The patent claimed both the product irbesartan
separately and the combination product irbesartan with a diuretic (HCTZ is a diuretic). The
referring court had established that only irbesartan constituted the "core inventive advance" of
the patent. The CJ noted that Sanofi could already act against a combination product with
irbesartan and HCTZ on the basis of its first SPC. The earlier SPC containing the (only)
protected active ingredient in this case precludes the issue of a second SPC.
In Georgetown II, the patent claimed a vaccine for the prevention of (human) papillomavirus
(HPV) infection comprising at least a protein or one or several claimed fragments of that
protein. Georgetown had obtained two SPCs claiming combinations of HPV fragments. Its
SPC application for one active ingredient, which was also part of the combination SPC, was
refused based on Article 3(c). As both the combination and the single active ingredient are
separately protected as 'products' as such by the patent, the CJ ruled that Article 3(c) did not
preclude Georgetown from obtaining an SPC for one of the active ingredients individually. In
other words, the earlier combination SPC did not concern the same (new) product in the sense
of Article 3(c). This is advantageous for the patent holder in cases where the patent protects
Questions remain
Yet, questions remain and new ones are raised by these decisions, including several questions
related to filing strategies of (multiple) SPCs:
• The second to fifth questions in Georgetown II are unanswered. Therefore, it
remains unclear whether holders of an SPC may decide to withdraw an SPC
application or surrender an SPC already granted to allow another SPC to be
• Interestingly, in Eli Lilly v HGS (par. 43), the CJ reflects on whether the holder of a
basic patent can apply for an SPC on the basis of an MA by a third party in the
specific circumstances of these proceedings. The CJ seems to suggest that an IPO
could refuse to grant an SPC to the patent holder, since this would be contrary to the
rationale of the SPC Regulation, therewith apparently suggesting that this is a
separate criterion for the granting of an SPC.
• In its ruling in Actavis v Sanofi, the CJ seems to make the fact that the first SPC (for
one active ingredient) can also be used to oppose the use of the active ingredient in
combination with other active ingredients conditional for the inadmissibility of a
second combination SPC. Does this suggest that the outcome in Georgetown II
might have been different had the first SPC been granted for one active ingredient
only instead of for the combination? If this reasoning were to be followed, one should
carefully review the order of obtaining an SPC in cases where the patent protects
• Does the CJ's consideration (par. 35 in Georgetown II): "Even if the protection conferred by two such SPCs were to overlap, they would, in principle, expire on the same date" have implications for the calculation of the duration of an SPC (Art. 13(1)
SPC Regulation)? In cases where a basic patent protects several products, it can
also be argued that the MA referred to in Art. 13(1) should be interpreted as the first
MA for the relevant product which could result in different expiry dates for SPCs
Practical significance
All three decisions broaden the possibility of obtaining SPCs and they remove a considerable
amount of the uncertainty created by earlier case law. However, they also raise new questions
and leave some queries unanswered. In Eli Lilly v HGS the CJ sanctions a broad
interpretation of the Medeva rule. Actavis v Sanofi and Georgetown II clarify that the rule 'one
SPC per patent' should be interpreted as 'one SPC per product per patent', provided each
product claimed is an active ingredient or a combination of active ingredients that is protected
These decisions should be reviewed carefully in view of your drafting and SPC filing practices.
Of course, we would be pleased to discuss the practical consequences these CJ decisions
If you have any questions or require further information regarding this legal alert please
Gertjan Kuipers | T +31 20 577 1042 | E Ilja Morée | T +31 20 577 1331 | E Jan Pieter Hustinx | T +31 20 577 1494 | E Margot Kokke | T +31 20 577 1511 | E Tjibbe Douma | T +31 20 577 1068 | E
VOR Cavalier Geel 4 jarige paarden plaats naam afstamming Prijzen-geld B.W.P.- Thunder van de Zuuthoeve x Eclinta van den Bosrand (Clinton)Zangersheide- Namelus R x Jolien (Ahorn Z)Zangersheide- Carosso VDL x Fonka-A (Electro)Zangersheide- Der Senaat 111 x Goa van de Nachtegaele (Quickfeuer)B.W.P.- DR. Doolittle x Air Dream (Aircraft)B.W.P.- Echo van het Neerenbosch x Celsa vd
Infrared thermometer testo 825-T1 is a versatile and quick-actioninfrared thermometer. Two practicalaccessories are included: the TopSafe caseprotects the instrument from dust, dirt,impact and water ingress while the wall/beltholder is used to position the instrument. Waterproof and robust thanks to TopSafe (IP67) Emissivity adjustable from 0.20 to 1.00 Checks surface